The Myth of a “Weakened but Not Defeated” Russia
Recent remarks by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that China cannot allow Russia to lose the war in Ukraine have been interpreted by political science professor Alexander Motyl in an optimistic way. According to him, Beijing sees the optimal outcome of the war as a scenario in which Russia is “weakened but does not lose.” Motyl argues that in such a case, the Kremlin will exhaust its forces and cease to pose a threat to global stability. He goes further, claiming that a weakened Moscow would allegedly become a bigger problem for Beijing than for Washington, meaning that such an outcome is more than acceptable to both the United States and Europe.
This interpretation seems elegant, but it is based on false premises.
Why Would Beijing Overlook What a U.S. Professor Sees?
If such an outcome of the war would indeed create more problems for China, why does Beijing not see it?
A U.S. professor notices it, while the experienced diplomat Wang Yi supposedly overlooks it? Something does not add up here.
What Does “Weakened but Not Defeated” Really Mean?
For Russia, and in the eyes of both itself and external observers, defeat can only be defined as a return to at least the pre-invasion borders of February 24, 2022 — that is, the loss of all territories seized during the full-scale invasion, as well as a direct threat to Crimea and the so-called “LNR” and “DNR.”
In that case, the enormous human losses and material damage would have been in vain: Russia would gain nothing tangible to justify them.
However, we are invited to consider a Russia that is weakened but has not lost. Thus, “not losing” can only mean one thing:
👉 the Kremlin retains at least part of the Ukrainian lands it has seized.
Within the “win–lose” paradigm — the very paradigm in which Vladimir Putin is waging this war, as opposed to the “non-zero-sum game” so beloved by Western analysts but irrelevant to this reality— even a fragment of Donbas, a land corridor to Crimea, or a tiny symbolic patch of Ukrainian territory would be regarded in Moscow not as some contrived “non-loss,” but as an outright victory.
Victory Is Measured by Results
Victory is measured not by losses, but by results — by who dictates the terms of peace.
If Moscow holds on to what it has captured, it dictates the terms.
Thus, all the rhetoric of the respected American professor degenerates into mere wordplay: Russia’s “non-loss” equals its “victory,” and that is exactly how it will be perceived worldwide.
The Consequences for Ukraine
For Ukraine, this would be a defeat — even if Kyiv retains control over most of its territory. Supported by the U.S. and Europe, the country would have failed to reclaim its lands and restore its territorial integrity.
That is the message to the world.
Furthermore, a peace settlement will not be limited to territorial issues: to sign any agreement, Moscow will impose many conditions regarding Ukraine’s internal affairs — new elections, changes in legislation, and much more.
It is impossible for the government in Kyiv to present the end of the war (even temporarily) at the cost of lost territories, population, and possibly restricted sovereignty as a “victory.”
The Consequences for the West
For the West, this would not be a compromise but a disaster.
The United States, despite its global supremacy, would demonstrate that it is incapable of confronting a regional power.
The world would again be convinced that the king has no clothes: Washington threatens sanctions and promises protection, but in practice, it cowers when decisive action is needed.
This is true not only of Donald Trump (“Trump Always Chickens Out”) but also of Joe Biden’s administration, which had behaved timidly throughout, failing in three years of war to develop any coherent strategy to support Ukraine and counter Russian aggression.
Former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul admitted in an interview with Yuri Dud that the Americans should have supplied Ukraine with all the necessary weapons back in 2022, which could have changed the course of the war entirely.
Any retention of occupied territories by Russia would be a powerful symbol that aggression pays off, while Western countries — the most developed and economically powerful — can barely contain a relatively weak aggressor.
The very idea of defeating such an aggressor and stopping the agression per se would seem out of the question.
For the Global South, it would become obvious that the West is not genuinely interested in preserving the current world order or its leading role in it — despite all the loud declarations.
Why This Scenario Benefits China
Contrary to Professor Motyl’s opinion, a “weakened but not defeated” Russia would not become a problem for Beijing.
On the contrary, it would strengthen China.
In such a state, Moscow would finally turn into a resource for China — a source of cheap oil, gas, metals, and military technologies (or what remains of them).
More importantly, a dependent Russia would become a strategic asset for Beijing. Its nuclear arsenal and geographical position with access to Europe would enhance China’s position against the United States.
It is pointless to claim that in the event of its “non-defeat” — or, to use plain language, victory — Russia would pose any serious threat to China.
Russia is in decline; it cannot challenge Beijing systemically. Nor would Putin want to: he sees China as a partner interested in the stability of his regime. Beijing, in turn, behaves tactfully enough not to provoke doubts in Moscow about the mutual benefit of this alliance.
The Real Threat in the 21st Century
For China, the main threat remains the United States, with its technological, military, and economic superiority, as well as its global network of alliances (though perhaps not for long).
The competition between Washington and Beijing is the foundation of 21st-century world politics, and no Russia can change that.
On the contrary, any form of Moscow’s “non-defeat” would strengthen Beijing’s position in this rivalry.
The Convenient Myth of a “Third Way”
Why, then, does the American professor invent the myth of an inevitable conflict between Russia and China, and claim that Russia’s victory — which he euphemistically calls a “non-loss” — does not entail negative consequences for the U.S. and the West?
Because this myth is convenient.
It justifies passivity:
The West, supposedly, can limit itself to containing Russia, while China will do the rest, as Moscow is also a problem for Beijing.
But Beijing will not “deal with” Russia.
It benefits when Russia weakens the United States, even at the cost of its own degradation — in fact, that is even better.
Then the Kremlin will fully turn into an instrument of Chinese policy, and the U.S. and Europe will have to deal with an increasingly solid and hostile alliance of two nuclear powers, under whose banners more and more states will gradually align, seeking strong and decisive allies and patrons.
Conclusion: Only Two Outcomes
Thus, the scenario that Motyl presents as optimal is, in reality, beneficial only to China.
Russia retains its conquests,
strengthens Beijing with its resources and nuclear arsenal,
the United States demonstrates to the world that it cannot effectively confront even a regional power.
This outcome would be perceived as the West’s strategic capitulation and an open invitation to new aggression.
It becomes clear that Motyl’s entire argument is not based on analysis, but on evasion of the obvious.
He invents a “third way” that does not exist in reality, simply to avoid calling things by their names.
This is not strategic depth but intellectual cowardice — an unwillingness to admit that in this war there are only two outcomes:
victory or defeat.
Any “compromise” in which the aggressor keeps what it has stolen is a defeat for the West, no matter how beautifully it is wrapped in words.